Thanks for the suggestion. Perhaps I can find something that I wrote at the time, back in 1962. I’ll be going through those papers later this year and will see what I can find. John

The two fundamental questions that every socialist needs to try to answer is (1) why did ‘real socialism’ fall and (2) why did the working class not struggle against the restoration of capitalism? I am happy about John Riddell’s review essay on my book on ‘real socialism’ because it highlights the importance of answering these questions, and I am sorry for this very reason that I could not turn my attention to his essay and the comments it provoked until now. While we share much in our focus, John and I clearly differ on the question of whether we need to know the particular history of the USSR [from the time of the revolution until the consolidation of the system after Stalin’s death) in order to grasp the nature of ‘real socialism’ as a reproducing system. (I also suspect we would differ in dating the point of degeneration of the October Revolution.)

My particular interest was to understand the characteristics of this system which transcended the particular experience of the USSR. Does my analysis of the system as one characterized by vanguard relations of production provide insight into the experience of Hungary, Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, China and, indeed, Vietnam and Cuba? And, is my analysis of the inner dynamic by which the logic of capital increasingly challenged and displaced the logic of the vanguard applicable outside the particular experience of the USSR? Certainly, one question that greatly interested me was the way in which economists functioned as the ideological spokespersons of capital, and I confess that as I wrote specifically about the Battle of Ideas in the USSR I could not avoid hearing its echoes in Cuban discussions in relation to the ‘updating’ of their model. In this respect, I urge Walter and anyone else following Cuban developments to read that chapter of my book to see if it resonates.

Of course, there are some who would like to wish away any discussion of internal tendencies and contradictions that can cast light on the two fundamental questions. Far better to blame it all on external forces because then we don’t have to change our thinking at all. (I explore this question in the July Science & Society.) Accordingly, to raise such matters must be a sign of trying to resurrect the Cold War (and a demonstration that you are clearly an enemy agent). This is the position advanced by a rearguard troll who identifies himself here as Vulcho but who called himself Bill Templer on Climate & Capitalism and FS on Links making the same points. Since I responded to his earlier posts, I’ll send my response to Vulcho/Bill Templer/FS out separately.

So, let me come back to repeat what I call the fundamental questions: why did ‘real socialism’ fall and why did [does?] the working class not struggle against the restoration of capitalism?

Thanks for the many comments on my review, particularly from those with personal experience of “Real Socialism.” My experience is much more limited, of course, but I will cite it for what it’s worth.

In 1962, I toured the USSR with a group of Canadian students. We wandered the city streets freely in small groups, talking to those of our age. I was then a Trotskyist, sceptical of the claims of Soviet leaders. Nonetheless, I was deeply impressed by the optimism of young Soviets regarding the gains that had been made and also the degree to which the distortions and crimes of the past were being wiped away. This was a time when the Soviet economy was widely regarded in the West as more dynamic than our own, and I saw lots of evidence of that — as well as of Soviet cultural achievements.

One month ago I took part in a Victory Day celebration in Toronto of up to 5,000 former Soviet residents, honouring what the Soviet Union had achieved for all humanity through its defeat of Nazism. I found it a deeply moving occasion — what a shame that Canadian government representatives were absent. The crowd displayed hundreds of soviet flags and much soviet insignia; many of the young people — men and women — were wearing Red Army-like uniforms; there were of course innumerable portraits of those who fought in the great war. It was good to know that awareness of this — perhaps the greatest Soviet achievement — and respect for the USSR is alive among the young generation, even when so far removed from the homeland.

Yes, the achievements of the Soviet Union need to be better remembered, and yes, socialism in the 21st century does not start from scratch (a point that Michael Lebowitz certainly makes clear). But when that is said, we are left with a puzzle. How do we explain the fact that the apparently so promising situation in the USSR when I visited it evolved in less than three decades to a total collapse? A collapse in which no significant forces attempted to salvage and build on the achievements of the great Russian October?

This demands an explanation, and reference to the objective difficulties in the USSR absolutely will not do. Yes, the U.S. military build-up under Reagan was a problem, but it was nothing compared to the obstacles the USSR had encountered and surmounted previously. Broadly speaking, as the pressure of imperialist encirclement on the USSR eased, its internal contradictions did not diminish but rather grew.

Well, Michael Lebowitz offers an explanation. It does not deny the USSR’s achievements; indeed his analysis is based on these social gains, which he summarizes as a “social contract.” Criticisms can be made, and I offered a few. But those who reject his analysis should point to an alternative explanation.

Whatever the weaknesses of Lebowitz’s position, he does not suffer from a lack of practical experience. Indeed, it is a great strength of his writing that it is based on extensive on-the-spot engagement with the problems of several revolutionary countries. For observations flowing from his Yugoslavian activity see his book “Build It Now.”

I think Lebowitz’ argument could probably be simplified as being that despite public ownership in the means of production as the result of a social revolution, the “real socialist” societies were unable to overcome the contradictions in the the division of labor inherited from capitalist society. Lebowitz uses the metaphor of a conductor and an orchestra to highlight the contradiction, but isn’t this the contradiction between mental and manual labor? Stalinist governments and parties insisted that while they acknowledged that this contradiction existed in their societies, that the revolution had somehow transformed these relationships to become “non-antagonistic,” and therefore creating a “non-antagonistic” working class and intelligentsia (just like they also claimed to have overcome contradictions between the proletariat and peasant commodity production). I think that this was the biggest contradiction that arose in the USSR, due to its relative underdevelopment and isolation. Its interesting to read what the Soviets themselves said on the matter, because while they’re right about the contradiction existing in society, they’re wrong about it being overcome when the means of production are brought into formal public ownership

Here is the Stalinists take on the opposition between mental and physical labor. I think everything in the analysis is sound except for the claim by the Stalinists that, because socialism had been “acheived” in a single country, that these relations became “non-antagonistic,” when in fact the contradiction between physical and mental labor actually increased, exacerbating bureaucratic degeneration http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Opposition+Between+Mental+and+Physical+Labor