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	<title>
	Comments on: Freedom for Joaquín Pérez Becerra!	</title>
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	<link>https://johnriddell.com/2011/05/17/freedom-for-joaquin-perez-becerra/</link>
	<description>MARXIST ESSAYS AND COMMENTARY</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sat, 28 May 2011 03:42:48 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>
		By: Dieter Misgeld		</title>
		<link>https://johnriddell.com/2011/05/17/freedom-for-joaquin-perez-becerra/#comment-18</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dieter Misgeld]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 28 May 2011 03:42:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://johnriddell.com/?p=489#comment-18</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[I am very much in agreement with the vast majority of the arguments
developed by John in this article, as well as those which he relies on as
stated by Luis Biloa and Socialist Alliance.
Obviously it is very important to take a strong position in defense of
Joaquin Perez Becerra&#039;s rights and those of all the political prisoners
treated cruelly by the Colombian regime and its allies.
I very much value John&#039;s drawing attention to the Canadian government&#039;s
active acquiescence in these practices and its misguided and servile listing
of the armed Colombian insurgencies( FARC and ELN) as &quot;terrorist&quot;
organizations , giving their &quot;Antiamericanism &quot; as a reason.
Nevertheless I have doubts regarding the integrity and astuteness of the
actions engaged in by the Venezuelan government in the Perez B. case.
They are these:
1. Even if handing Perez Becerra over to  Colombian intelligence and police
was meant to avoid a trap, to avoid jeopardizing the initial negotiations
for setting up CELAC, the new Latin American organisation, this does NOT
justify, under any circumstance, breaking international agreements,
spreading malicious and thoughtless comments , treating Mr. Perez B. rudely
and forcing his abduction with violence, not permitting the representative
of the Swedish government to speak with his/her citizen, and to repress and
slander criticism of these actions within Venezuela and from among members
of the Bolivarian movement.. Consider the following:
1. Chavez assumes personal responsibility for this action, and suggests, in
one statement, that as he delivered a terrorist to Cuba( the one responsible
for blowing up a Cuban plane many years ago, killing 80 or more persons in
the plane) , so he now handed another over to Colombia. He avoided referring
to  P. Becerra as a terrorist, but left implied that this is what he meant(
see article in Spanish by Heinz Dieterich, in . As we know,
Chavez does not always weigh his words, unfortunately.
2. Many capable people have resigned from Telesur or other government
connected news outlets in Venezuela. A prominent broadcaster just was forced
to resign or she was fired, exactly because she criticized Chavez in the
matter of Perez. .
3. The Colombian insurgency cannot give up its arms and look for a political
solution, as long as the Colombian government, army, paramilitary
organizations, and the US government and military work toward total defeat
and destruction of it- which is what they are doing and what Santos says he
is doing.
It is dishonest and self-serving on Chavez&#039; part to lecture the insurgency
and tell them that they must look for a political solution. Yes, if he were
to assume responsibility for mediating in the conflict- rather than wanting
to be on the winning side, i.e the Colombian government&#039;s and the US, in the
end. For, &quot;objectively&#039;, that is what his position comes to.
4. Clarity about the ethics involved is important: one does not willingly
surrender an
avowed critic of a malicious counterinsurgency regime, of which one does not
approve, in order to further apparently larger poltical projects. Betrayal
is never justified , no matter how lofty the purpose. And that is what many
people now fear in Latin America, especially people of the Left: that Chavez
and the Bolivarian project in Venezuela can no longer be trusted.
5. Honduras:I am not ready yet to regard this as a victory for Venezuelan
diplomacy. If it is or becomes one, it may ver well turn out to be Pyrrhic.
And the poor and dispossessed will once again be abandoned to heir terrible
fate, for the sake of some sort of political/diplomatic arrangement. For the
return of Zelaya does not guarantee major social change , as has been noted
by the section of the resistance which is not primarily concerned with his
return and the face-saving restitution of constitutional government. Should
the latter be the reult then Santos&#039;  Diplomacy could claim victory, as it
likely will. But that remains to be seen. ,
5. Finally, We should be vigilant critics of the Bolivarian government and
Chavez, They need criticism from and by the Left. Especially as they do not
like it and fear it. They must be taught to learn to live with it and take
it seriously.
I value John Riddell&#039;s determination to turn the criticism in the direction
where most of it belongs, the Colombian government.
Nevertheless, we may not let Chavez and his government off the hook. It is
not good for them nor for us, to become preoccupied with strategy and
tactics , rather than to remain utterly clear about fundamental ethical
principles. For as this clarity is lost, socialist projects deteriorate and
are contaminated by the &quot;Machiavellian&quot; reasoning which has always
accompanied politics.

Dieter Misgeld]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am very much in agreement with the vast majority of the arguments<br />
developed by John in this article, as well as those which he relies on as<br />
stated by Luis Biloa and Socialist Alliance.<br />
Obviously it is very important to take a strong position in defense of<br />
Joaquin Perez Becerra&#8217;s rights and those of all the political prisoners<br />
treated cruelly by the Colombian regime and its allies.<br />
I very much value John&#8217;s drawing attention to the Canadian government&#8217;s<br />
active acquiescence in these practices and its misguided and servile listing<br />
of the armed Colombian insurgencies( FARC and ELN) as &#8220;terrorist&#8221;<br />
organizations , giving their &#8220;Antiamericanism &#8221; as a reason.<br />
Nevertheless I have doubts regarding the integrity and astuteness of the<br />
actions engaged in by the Venezuelan government in the Perez B. case.<br />
They are these:<br />
1. Even if handing Perez Becerra over to  Colombian intelligence and police<br />
was meant to avoid a trap, to avoid jeopardizing the initial negotiations<br />
for setting up CELAC, the new Latin American organisation, this does NOT<br />
justify, under any circumstance, breaking international agreements,<br />
spreading malicious and thoughtless comments , treating Mr. Perez B. rudely<br />
and forcing his abduction with violence, not permitting the representative<br />
of the Swedish government to speak with his/her citizen, and to repress and<br />
slander criticism of these actions within Venezuela and from among members<br />
of the Bolivarian movement.. Consider the following:<br />
1. Chavez assumes personal responsibility for this action, and suggests, in<br />
one statement, that as he delivered a terrorist to Cuba( the one responsible<br />
for blowing up a Cuban plane many years ago, killing 80 or more persons in<br />
the plane) , so he now handed another over to Colombia. He avoided referring<br />
to  P. Becerra as a terrorist, but left implied that this is what he meant(<br />
see article in Spanish by Heinz Dieterich, in . As we know,<br />
Chavez does not always weigh his words, unfortunately.<br />
2. Many capable people have resigned from Telesur or other government<br />
connected news outlets in Venezuela. A prominent broadcaster just was forced<br />
to resign or she was fired, exactly because she criticized Chavez in the<br />
matter of Perez. .<br />
3. The Colombian insurgency cannot give up its arms and look for a political<br />
solution, as long as the Colombian government, army, paramilitary<br />
organizations, and the US government and military work toward total defeat<br />
and destruction of it- which is what they are doing and what Santos says he<br />
is doing.<br />
It is dishonest and self-serving on Chavez&#8217; part to lecture the insurgency<br />
and tell them that they must look for a political solution. Yes, if he were<br />
to assume responsibility for mediating in the conflict- rather than wanting<br />
to be on the winning side, i.e the Colombian government&#8217;s and the US, in the<br />
end. For, &#8220;objectively&#8217;, that is what his position comes to.<br />
4. Clarity about the ethics involved is important: one does not willingly<br />
surrender an<br />
avowed critic of a malicious counterinsurgency regime, of which one does not<br />
approve, in order to further apparently larger poltical projects. Betrayal<br />
is never justified , no matter how lofty the purpose. And that is what many<br />
people now fear in Latin America, especially people of the Left: that Chavez<br />
and the Bolivarian project in Venezuela can no longer be trusted.<br />
5. Honduras:I am not ready yet to regard this as a victory for Venezuelan<br />
diplomacy. If it is or becomes one, it may ver well turn out to be Pyrrhic.<br />
And the poor and dispossessed will once again be abandoned to heir terrible<br />
fate, for the sake of some sort of political/diplomatic arrangement. For the<br />
return of Zelaya does not guarantee major social change , as has been noted<br />
by the section of the resistance which is not primarily concerned with his<br />
return and the face-saving restitution of constitutional government. Should<br />
the latter be the reult then Santos&#8217;  Diplomacy could claim victory, as it<br />
likely will. But that remains to be seen. ,<br />
5. Finally, We should be vigilant critics of the Bolivarian government and<br />
Chavez, They need criticism from and by the Left. Especially as they do not<br />
like it and fear it. They must be taught to learn to live with it and take<br />
it seriously.<br />
I value John Riddell&#8217;s determination to turn the criticism in the direction<br />
where most of it belongs, the Colombian government.<br />
Nevertheless, we may not let Chavez and his government off the hook. It is<br />
not good for them nor for us, to become preoccupied with strategy and<br />
tactics , rather than to remain utterly clear about fundamental ethical<br />
principles. For as this clarity is lost, socialist projects deteriorate and<br />
are contaminated by the &#8220;Machiavellian&#8221; reasoning which has always<br />
accompanied politics.</p>
<p>Dieter Misgeld</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
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